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Introduction 
One of the highest honours that a research and scholarly community can bestow on its 
members is to pay sustained and careful attention to their work. In philosophy, this attention 
ultimately translates into constructive criticism. So, when the project for this special issue 
finally took shape, I was very flattered but I also expected a robust dose of disagreement. I 
have not been disappointed. 
Criticism is in the very nature of any philosophical investigation. With its intrinsically 
open questions (Floridi [2004b]) philosophy invites dialogue in the form of objections and 
replies, suggestions for revisions and proposals for further improvements. The scientist may 
find this process of creative destruction unfamiliar: she might dislike it as at best fruitless, at 
worst counterproductive, in any case suspiciously symptomatic of a lack of clear criteria – 
through which progress might be assessed – and hard data, by which the same progress might 
be anchored and constrained. That scientist may not be in error about the facts, but she would 
certainly be mistaken about their interpretation, for she would be confusing the different 
directions in which philosophy and science move. Scientists build, whereas philosophers dig.  
In building, one cannot help but establish every higher step on a lower step. It is 
trivial to remark that there is no second floor without a first and that the solidity of the 
construction heavily depends on the reliability of every layer. Trust and team-work is 
everything, getting things right vital. That is why scientific revolutions happen rarely but, 
when they do, they are as dangerous as major earthquakes.  
In digging, on the other hand, every independent shovelful helps. So philosophers are 
more akin to individual explorers of the depth, and are more likely to proceed by removing 
rather than augmenting, reminding one of Michelangelo’s definition of sculpture (the art of 
“taking away”, as opposed to the art of “adding on” characteristic of painting). As we all 
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know, the higher one wishes to build, the more deeply (or better: profoundly) one needs to 
explore. Yet philosophers not only search for the deepest and hardest grounds on which our 
understanding may rest more safely; they also – or perhaps I should say mainly, in these anti-
foundationalist days – seek to extract precious conceptual resources that, once unearthed, 
purified and carefully processed, may help humanity to make sense of an ever changing 
reality. We do not pass slabs, like collaborative Wittgensteinian constructors, we go back into 
the darkness of Plato’s cave to help ourselves and others. Our hands are hardened and dirty. 
Forget about Athena, our god is Hephaestus. 
The result is that, in the philosophical underground, where everything is so dimly lit 
and hidden, one often hears other explorers shouting curses, advices and warnings.  These are 
not sterile invitations; these are signs of passion and interest in the work being done.  
 It is with this general picture of a collaborative enterprise in mind that I have tried to 
address the criticisms and suggestions elaborated in this collection of essays on my work on 
Information Ethics (IE). I believe IE to provide both a reliable foundation for a wider ethical 
discourse and to offer valuable resources to make sense of our time and the information 
revolution that characterises it. But I am also aware that it is a field that we have only started 
to explore (Floridi [2008b]). 
Charles Ess has done an admirable work in summarising and framing the essays, and I 
am deeply indebted to his masterly handling of so many threads and to his insightful advices. 
I doubt his synthesis could be improved. I owe him more bottles of wine than I can 
remember. So if you see us tipsy at the next conference, you know why. 
My contribution has been to address, in each essay, what I thought was the most 
salient points been made. But I have also tried to avoid repetitions, so the reader may find 
that some recurrent issues are addressed only once, where they play a more central role. I 
have also pointed out in a few cases possible internal references to other articles, but only 
when I thought it was really useful.  
I am aware that, in many cases, I failed to do justice to the value of the theoretical 
analyses offered by so many colleagues from whom I have learnt so much. To my 
justification, I may point out that IE is a very rich and still largely unexploited mine. So the 
reader who may find some of the essays or my replies less than satisfactory is very welcome 
to join us. The advice to the graduate student is that there is plenty of rewarding work to be 
done. 
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Reply to Stahl 
 
In his article, Bernd Carsten Stahl states that his “main concern is the question of universality 
of IE”, while his “main contention is that Floridi's universality claim [concerning IE] is not 
always clear and possibly even contradictory”. Although he discusses several other important 
topics and touches upon many interesting issues, I agree with Stahl that the aforementioned 
contention and concern are the most important and serious. Luckily, one can also address 
them together. For Stahl’s concern and contention go hand in hand, or at least Stahl offers no 
reason to believe that they do not, which means that it will be sufficient to dispose of the 
latter (the contention) to appease the former (the concern) as well. 
The contention appears to be based on at least two points. Both are in need of 
clarification. The first regards the misconception that treating all entities as informational 
objects, including human beings, means somehow diminishing our “human dignity”. This is 
not an unusual complain, but it is misaddressed, somewhat outdated and definitely 
unproductive. I still recall one conference in the nineties when a famous computer ethicist 
compared me to a sort of Nazi, who wished to reduce humans to numbers, pointing out that 
Nazi used to tattoo six-digit identity tags on the left arms of the prisoners in their Lager. This 
is rhetorical nonsense. Suggesting that “surely we are not just...”, is an old line that was 
already flawed when used against Darwin. Of course we are not just animals, but treating 
human beings as animals or, if you find the expression infelicitous, adopting the Level of 
Abstraction (LoA) at which one analyses humans as bipedal primates belonging to the 
mammalian species Homo sapiens, does not detract one iota from our nature. On the 
contrary, such naturalization makes it more likely that we might understand and appreciate a 
side of ourselves otherwise easily neglected. Now, in the same way as we are biological 
organisms, which share with their natural environment a long history of co-evolution, 
likewise, we can look at ourselves (change the LoA) as informational organisms, or inforgs. 
And this informalization also helps us to appreciate our nature and our relation to reality, now 
understood as the infosphere. IE adopts this informational ontology (or better: the 
corresponding LoA) as a minimal common denominator that unifies all entities. We are not 
just inforgs, but we should not fear to consider ourselves as inforgs. This is the first sense in 
which IE is universal. It is the inclusive sense that the logician will immediately recognise as 
part of the extensional meaning of a universal quantification: all entities are informational in 
nature, and IE seeks to address the ethical issues that pertain to all of them. 
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 The second point concerns a mistaken view about how one may choose between 
different LoAs. It is not just a matter of whimsical preference, personal taste, or subjective 
inclination of the moment. The reader working in computer science knows already too well 
that one should never underestimate a crucial component in any use of a LoA, namely its goal 
or the “what for?” question. There is a perfectly reasonable LoA, say in terms of shape and 
topology, at which dad’s shoes can be observed and even used as ships; but when Columbus 
grows up, he will find that ludic LoA useless for the purpose of reaching America. LoAs are 
teleological, or goal-oriented. Thus, when observing a building, which LoA one should adopt 
– architectural, emotional, financial, historical, legal, and so forth – depends on the goal of 
the analysis.  There is not “right” LoA independently of the purpose for which it is adopted, 
in the same sense in which there is no right tool independently of the job that needs to be 
done. So, the position held by IE is that, when it comes to talk about ethical issues in an 
ontocentric and more inclusive, non-anthropocentric way, an informational LoA does a good 
job. This is the real thesis that one may wish to criticise. Unfortunately, it is overlooked in the 
article. The two alternatives proposed there fail to grasp the point. In EI, it is not a matter of 
showing that “the choice of the right LoA is an ethical imperative in itself”, for goals can 
often be reached equally well in different ways: a hammer and a shoe can both be used to nail 
a painting to the wall. Nor is “the infosphere the highest LoA”, for LoAs rarely come ordered 
in hierarchies, as one is easily reminded by the previous example about the house (asking 
which LoA is the highest would be missing the point). Indeed, Plato, Berkeley, Spinoza, or 
perhaps, I dare say, even  Heidegger or Buddhist philosophy, all adopt equally abstract LoAs, 
just to mention a wide selection of different positions. So this is the second, non-relativistic 
sense in which IE claims to be universal: its analysis is based on the reasonable choice of a 
plausible and fruitful approach to the sort of new ethical problems emerging in the 
information society. Of course, one may disagree on the value of the approach. But the 
charges of relativism (any LoA is a good LoA) and absolutism (there is only one right LoA, 
the highest) could not be more misplaced. 
 At this point, it is worth asking what exactly is being universalised when we request 
an ethics to be universal. Here is what one may mean. 
1) Universality as universal applicability of ethics to all entities concerned by the moral 
discourse. This is one of the senses in which Stahl speaks of universality as a matter of 
“validity” or “scope, range or applicability”. We have seen not only that IE satisfies it but 
also that it does so better than many other theories, since it endorses a wider scope of ethical 
concerns. 
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2) Universality as universal impartiality of ethics. This second sense is strictly related to (1), 
insofar as it qualifies the sort of universal applicability in question (the applicability is 
impartial). In this case too, IE can only be said to be more impartial than many other theories 
which, for example, discriminate between living and non-living beings, or human/rational 
and non-human/non-rational agents. 
3) Universality as universal acceptability of ethics by everyone involved, who shares it 
without coercion. This might be what Stahl means when he refers to “universal values”, 
shared by all, and to “the ethical theory's strategy of convincing agents to accept or to follow 
it”. This third sense requires some disambiguation. Insofar as it is a matter of empirical 
description, the most universal ethics in the first (applicability) and second (impartiality) 
sense above may still fail to be universally acceptable in the third (acceptability) sense if, for 
example, there exists a group of agents who is determined to reject it. In this sense, the 
existence of the Ku Klux Klan would undermine the universality of human rights. True, so 
this is not what can be at stake here. Insofar as it is a matter of normative prescription – an 
ethics ought to be universally acceptable by anyone without coercion – then (3) reduces to a 
combination of (1) and (2). In other words, it is because a theory is universally applicable and 
impartial that it might rightly aspire to gain uncoerced acceptance. But then it follows that 
any theory that satisfies (1) and (2) is strategically well-positioned (or at least as well 
positioned as any other) to satisfy (3) as well. And we have seen that IE does satisfy (1) and 
(2), so IE is not challenged by (3), or at least no more than other macroethics.   
4) Universality as universal inclusivity of ethics. This holistic sense is different from (1) or 
(2) insofar as it refers to the capacity of a theory not only of applying to the specific agents 
and patients involved in a particular moral action, but also of widening its consideration to 
ever larger circles of interested parties as stakeholders, who may be taken into account when 
evaluating a moral action. Now, if any theory seeks to be inclusive, this is certainly IE, which 
I have often described as an extension of environmental ethics that looks at a wider and more 
inclusive environment. Indeed, critics have moved the objection that IE runs the risk of being 
too inclusive.   
5) Universality as anti-relativism of ethics. This last sense has already been discussed above, 
where we have seen how IE succeeds in being non-relativistic without falling into the trap of 
being authoritarian or absolute. 
 To summarise, in any of the five senses in which an ethics might be requested to be 
universal, IE turns out to be in a rather satisfactory position. Indeed, one should acknowledge 
that it performs better than many other theories. Stahl’s contention is ungrounded: 
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universality claims concerning IE are neither unclear nor contradictory. And without 
contention there is no ground for concern either.  
 Let me now add two corrections before concluding. First, when defining the 
Philosophy of Information (PI, Floridi [2003]), the term “information” should not be used 
only in a semantic sense (Floridi [2005]), contrary to what is stated in the article. PI and IE 
are also concerned with ontological issues that refer to informational entities and the 
infosphere, not to semantic content only. This misunderstanding is particularly damaging 
insofar as the article seems to be based on the idea that the concept of informational entity is 
used in the sense that “information is a description of something”. Second, it is imprecise and 
confusing to say that a Level of Abstraction “requires the agent to follow ontological 
commitments”, since a LoA rather expresses (often only implicitly) a specific ontological 
commitment, which the agent may or may not endorse. 
 The article by Bernd Carsten Stahl is a detailed and insightful analysis of IE, and the 
comparison between IE and Discourse Ethics is both innovative and remarkably enlightening. 
It is my conviction that more work along this comparative line might easily prove very 
fruitful in the future. 
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Reply to Brey 
 
Phil Brey’s article concerns IE’s defence of the intrinsic value of informational entities or, 
more precisely, of Being in all its varieties and manifestations, understood in terms of an 
informational ontology. Brey acknowledges that many features of IE are interesting and even 
shareable. This positive assessment enables him to grasp IE better than other, less insightful, 
interpreters. Indeed, his solid understanding of IE is such that it leads him close to endorsing 
the whole approach. Only “close”, however, because, as Brey himself acknowledges, four 
difficulties still prevent him from accepting IE in full. This is regrettable, given that such 
difficulties are based on a few simple confusions and mistakes that are easily fixable, as we 
shall see. So it is to be hoped that, once they are removed, Brey’s acceptance of IE will no 
longer be conditional or qualified. 
 First difficulty. According to Brey “the first problem with the argument lies in 
Floridi’s inference from the fact that some objects, like rocks and objects of cultural heritage 
deserve respect that they therefore have intrinsic value”. Brey is right, yet not for the reason 
he believes himself to be right. True, the reasoning he sketches is blatantly fallacious, so 
anyone adopting it cannot but fail to be convincing. The trouble is that I would never endorse 
that reasoning in the first place. Brey confuses a causal with an inferential reasoning. A quick 
analogy will help. Suppose you tell me that your car does not start because its battery is flat. 
Next, I take you as saying that if your car does not start then its battery is flat. I then proceed 
to show you that you are wrong, for it takes a second to realise that your car may not start for 
a thousand other reasons (no petrol, for example). Of course, you are not impressed, but 
complain that I misconstrued what you meant: you said “because” but I attributed you an 
“if... then...” explanation. Now, let’s go back to IE. The actual argument seeks to establish 
that entities deserve respect because they have intrinsic value, not that if entities deserve 
respect then they have intrinsic value. The latter inference is simply untenable, as Brey easily 
shows, but it is also irrelevant, as anyone may appreciate in the analogy of the car with the 
flat battery. It is the causal explanation that is at stake and that (not the fallacious inference 
formulated by Brey) leads to the really interesting problem: do non-sentient entities have 
some minimal, easily overridable but still intrinsic value? Without rehearsing the whole 
discussion, I agree that the answer here can be difficult to grasp. For it consists in shifting the 
burden of proof by asking, from a patient-oriented perspective, whether there is anything in 
the universe that is intrinsically and positively worthless ethically and hence rightly 
disrespectable in this particular sense, i.e., insofar as its intrinsic value is concerned (again, 
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something might deserve to be disrespected for other reasons, e.g., instrumentally or 
symbolically, as I have repeatedly clarified in the past).  In short, one line of reasoning in 
favour of IE’s position – the only one discussed by Brey, although there are others1 – is that, 
because we lack arguments against the intrinsic value of Being in all its manifestations, we 
are led to expand an environmental approach to all non-sentient beings.  The injunction is to 
treat something as intrinsically valuable and hence worthy of moral respect by default, until 
“proven guilty”. 
Brey seems to think that “if we are to start valuing things as intrinsically valuable that 
we do not already value as such, we need good reasons to do so.  Since people do not 
normally seem to assign intrinsic value to information objects, Floridi needs to provide strong 
arguments for us to start valuing them as such”. This is a dangerous error, for several reasons. 
First, what people normally assign intrinsic value to is a matter of sociology (description) not 
of ethics (prescription) and moving from one to the other means committing an obvious 
naturalistic fallacy (how the latter is avoided by IE is convincingly explained by 
Hongladarom’s article in this issue). Second, history is full of “people” who failed to assign 
intrinsic value to at least some human beings (e.g. slaves, women, homosexuals, black, 
foreigners, Jews, handicapped, children, Indians, immigrants..., the menu is rich in choices), 
but it would be odd to argue that they are (or even were) right until proved wrong. Third, Vox 
populi vox Dei (literally: the voice of the people is God’s voice) has never been a decent 
argument but, if one really likes to stick to the alleged “wisdom of crowds”, why not choose 
the “right crowd”? For example, several philosophical schools, as well as many Buddhist, 
Christian, Hindu, Taoist or Shinto cultures, attribute intrinsic value both to sentient and to 
non-sentient realities. Finally, the logical mistake is with the initial argument itself. For its 
rationale is a conservative and cautious attitude that might be fine, when talking about 
potential moral risks of evil, but is out of place when engaging with the morally good. 
Consider its form: if we start x-ing things as intrinsically x-able that we do not already x as 
such, we need good reasons to do so. Now, it makes a big and quite obvious difference 
whether we replace x with negative (hate, destroy, despise, discriminate etc.) or positive 
attitudes (love, admire, cherish, protect, etc.). For example, “if we start hating things as 
intrinsically hateable that we do not already hate as such, we need good reasons to do so” 
might sound reasonable. But “if we start loving things as intrinsically lovable that we do not 
already love as such, we need good reasons to do so” is definitely questionable, for love does 
                                                 
1 See for example the argument, based on the concept of “ontic trust”, in Floridi [2007]. 
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not bear very much accountancy. In other words, we should not fear to respect the universe 
too much.  Rather, as Augustine nicely put it, dilige, at quod vis fac (love/respect and do what 
you wish).2     
Second difficulty. Brey wonders “why should the correct account of intrinsic value be 
a general, minimalist, homogenous account [...]?”. The “because” is in the pudding. Less 
metaphorically and more explicitly, we encounter here a twofold confusion. First, there is no 
“the correct account”. This approach belongs to a non-pluralist and hence inevitably 
intolerant way of doing ethics that IE seeks to overcome. There are, however, “correct 
accounts” that may complement and reinforce each other, like stones in an arch. The second 
confusion concerns precisely what makes them “correct”. Suppose someone says that he is a 
good driver. Although one might require him to produce a driving license, nobody would 
demand a syllogism. If pushed, one would eventually test the person’s skills by having him 
actually driving a car. The reader acquainted with Wittgenstein’s distinction between saying 
and showing will find this familiar. Now, IE tries to show in practice that there is a way of 
conceptualising Being informationally in such a way as to build a minimalist and 
homogenous account of all entities (Floridi [2004a], Floridi [2008a], Floridi [forthcoming]). 
IE also tries to show in practice that this is a correct account. Brey himself acknowledges this 
much at the beginning of the article. So he provides all the resources to answer his own 
question. 
Third difficulty. Brey claims that “IE is committed to an untenable egalitarianism in 
the valuation of information objects.  [...] from the point of view of IE, a work of Shakespeare 
is as valuable as a piece of pulp fiction, and a human being as valuable as a vat of toxic 
waste. Floridi will no doubt reply that differentiation is possible because some objects have 
additional worth beyond their status as information objects. But note that any such sources of 
additional worth lie beyond the scope of IE, because IE only assigns worth to things qua 
information objects. IE tells us that we should be equally protective of human beings and vats 
of toxic waste, or of any other information object, and that we have an (albeit overridable) 
duty to contribute to the improvement and flourishing of pieces of lint and human excrement.  
At best, this suggests that IE gives us very little guidance in making moral choices.  At worst, 
it suggests that IE gives us the wrong kind of guidance.” 
                                                 
2 Augustine, “Homily on the First Epistle of St John”, Eng. tr. available in Augustine [1984]. Note that 
Augustine uses the Latin “diligere”, not “amare”, a term that precisely refers to love as careful respect. As well, 
this is in keeping with the emphasis in IE highlighted in this issue by Hongladarom – that IE’s informational 
ontocentrism is a naturalistic philosophy that closely resonates with Spinoza, Plato, Confucius, and Buddhist 
thought (among others) in its affirmation of the intrinsic moral worth of the cosmos as such. 
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The trouble with this criticism is that it misses a crucial point, often repeated in the 
literature and well-stressed by other interpreters in this special issue: the position taken by IE 
is metaphysical. When defending the intrinsic value of all aspects of Being, understood as 
informational entities, the point at stake is not some daft idea about the intrinsic value of 
Shakespeare vs. Dan Brown, or chocolate vs. excrement. Brey should know better, for the 
summary of IE that he provides at the beginning of the article states this rather clearly. The 
actual issue is whether Goodness and Being (capitals meant) might be two sides of the same 
concept, as Evil and Non-being might be. Again, the reader sufficiently acquainted with the 
history of Western philosophy need not be told about the classic thinkers, including Plato, 
Aristotle, Plotinus, Augustine, Aquinas and Spinoza, who have elaborated and defended in 
various ways this fundamental equation. For Plato, for example, Goodness and Being are 
intimately connected. Plato's universe is value-ridden at its very roots: value is there from the 
start, not imposed upon it by a rather late-coming, new mammalian species of animals, as if 
before evolution had the chance of hitting upon homo sapiens the universe were a value-
neutral reality, devoid of any moral worth. What the article fails to grasp is that, by and large, 
IE proposes the same line of reasoning, by updating it in terms of an informational ontology, 
whereby Being is understood informationally and Non-being in terms of entropy. Note that 
this is not a defence of IE but an explanation of why Brey’s objection fails to apply. Although 
being in the company of Plato or Spinoza, for example, might be reassuring, it is not an 
insurance against being mistaken. What I am arguing is that, having missed the key point 
regarding the informational ontology supported by IE, the rest of the article runs into 
problems of its own making. Above all, it misses the minimalist approach defended by IE, 
which invites one to consider every entity ethically valuable in itself and deserving some 
moral respect to begin with, exactly in the same way as environmental ethics invites us to 
approach any form of life as worth preserving, if possible. Nobody would ever argue that this 
is equivalent to saying that a spider’s and a human life are equally worthy of respect. Culling, 
for example, is an ethical duty in environmental ethics. And even in Buddhism, killing 
animals is a minor offence (pāyantika) compared to the much more serious offence (pārājika) 
represented by killing a human being. Likewise, in IE the destruction of entities might easily 
be not only inevitable but also mandatory. Again, IE is not about respecting a single grain of 
sand as much as one respects the whole earth full of life or other human beings. It is about 
placing the threshold below which something should be morally disrespectable in itself and 
rightly so. With a Cartesian analogy, Brey’s mistake lies in thinking that, if one argues that 
all physical things are extended, then one is arguing that they are all of the same size. Of 
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course they are not, and nobody could reasonably argue that they are. To revert to IE, the 
view that all entities are at least minimally and overridably valuable in themselves should not 
be confused with the view that they all share the same value. Contrary to what Brey seems to 
think, the adverbs play a crucial role there. As for IE offering little guidance, Brey is 
contradicting himself. This would be equivalent to saying that, since environmental ethics is 
based on the value of life and of the absence of suffering, then it offers little help with real-
world issues. The truth is exactly the opposite (see for example Tavani’s and Burk’s articles 
in this issue). Having some general, basic and robust principles in place helps enormously 
when it comes to dealing with complex, practical matters. So much so that, at the beginning 
of the article, Brey himself reports on the growing number of applications that are taking 
advantage of the conceptual frame provided by IE. 
Fourth and last difficulty. Brey complains that “if information objects are to possess 
intrinsic value, they cannot be observer dependent, because for an object to possess intrinsic 
value it must possess one or more properties that bestow intrinsic value upon it, such as the 
property of being rational, being capable of suffering, or being an information object. Such 
properties have to be objective and inalienable properties of the object in question, not 
subjective or contingent ones, because otherwise the assigned value is (at best) extrinsic, that 
is, resulting from the attribution of contingent roles or subjective meanings to objects.” What 
lies behind this is a conceptual confusion. When we adopt a Level of Abstraction at which we 
observe things in terms of their chemical composition, for example, this does not make water 
contingently and subjectively H2O. The same applies to the adoption of an information-
theoretical LoA. A LoA is an interface that takes advantage of the constraints and affordances 
offered by the system under observation, in view of a specific goal.3 Once this is grasped, the 
second step is to realise that IE tries to move from a materialist ontology to an informational 
one. As stressed above, this is a matter of metaphysics, not science, so anyone suggesting that 
information science, as a science for describing the universe, is not on a par with chemistry or 
physics, commits a category mistake, using Ryle’s terminology. Once the ground is cleared 
of all these confusions and errors, it is obvious that Object-Oriented Programming (OOP) is 
provided only as a means to help make sense of an informational ontology. Compare this to 
Plato’s or Descartes’ use of geometry to make sense of their metaphysical views. Nobody 
ever complained that the development of, say, non-Euclidean geometry or topology 
undermined their ontologies, for this is merely irrelevant. 
                                                 
3 [Editor’s note: the reader is encouraged to compare this point with previous discussion of LoA in Floridi’s 
response to Stahl.] 
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There are many other questions raised by Brey’s article that would be interesting to 
discuss. For example, his proposal – which, he claims, “could solve many of the problems 
with IE that were discussed” – would set us back several decades, by making us embrace a 
conservative, anthropocentric and strongly Western-oriented perspective that new trends in 
applied ethics, from bioethics to environmental ethics, from medical ethics to IE, have been 
trying to overcome for some time (see Adam’s article in this collection). Or consider the 
distinction between moral and instrumental reasons for doing “the right thing”, which is 
ignored in the article. In the US, for example, the death penalty is increasingly controversial 
not because people have come to grips with its immorality, but because they have come to 
realise that it is uneconomical, since in the American system it is far more expensive to 
execute someone than to jail that person for life (The Economist [Aug 30th 2007]). Yet, any 
increase in the unpopularity of the death penalty is certainly welcome; no matter how 
disappointing the explanation can be, ethically speaking. Likewise, one could motivate agents 
to act morally towards the whole infosphere instrumentally (perhaps using egoistic or 
economic arguments) without, for this reason, having to drop the ethical stance. But there is 
no more space to explore these issues.  
In conclusion, I am afraid that Brey’s article is a missed opportunity. Having started 
describing IE quite accurately, it then fails to show how the difficulties it raises could be 
resolved within the framework it just laid down. It reminds one of someone who, having well 
crafted the handle of what might be an excellent knife then forgets to attach it to a blade and 
ends up complaining that it does not cut. The handle is a good first step, but it is not its fault 
if things are not working according to plan. Without completing the job properly there can be 
no chances of success. 
 13
Reply to Grodzinsky, Miller and Wolf 
 
The shortest way of summarising my comment on Grodzinsky’s, Miller’s and Wolf’s article 
is that I agree entirely with it. In the rest of this reply, I only wish to qualify this agreement. 
 Let me first stress an aspect that is well highlighted in the article, but that it is often 
missed by other interpreters: “Designers have an increased burden of care in programming 
artificial agents that exhibit learning* and intentionality*”. I find this absolutely correct, as I 
have been arguing for some time (Floridi and Sanders [2005]). We should come to terms with 
the fact that technologies in general (think for example of biochemical engineering, genetic 
technologies or nanotechnologies), and ICT in particular, place god-like (demiurgic, in 
Plato’s terminology, see Floridi and Sanders [2005]) responsibilities on our shoulders, both 
positively, in terms of what we create and do, and negatively, in terms of what we fail to 
create and do (Floridi [2006]). The more likely it is that we may unleash extremely powerful 
artificial agents in our natural and synthetic environments, the more demanding our moral 
duties become to exercise care, foresight, prevention and even restraint. Consider the pace at 
which unmanned military weapons are being developed nowadays or software agents are 
becoming autonomous and ubiquitous. Perhaps certain kind of artefacts should never be built. 
In Septermber 2008, for example, The Wall Street Journal reported that Google News picked 
up an obscure reprint of a 2002 article about United Airlines’ risk of bankruptcy. Although 
United Airlines had since recovered, there was no dateline, so Google News ran the story as 
current news. It was then distributed widely by other news aggregators and eventually 
became a headline on Bloomberg. This triggered automated trading programs and a 
devaluation of the airlines’ stock from $12 to $3, evaporating 1.14 billion dollars in 
shareholder wealth, close to United's total market value. Later n the day, the stock recovered, 
but not entirely, and at the end of the day was trading at $9.62, a market cap of $300M less 
than before Google ran the story. Any more doubts about whether artificial agents may do 
evil? 
 This leads to a second important point of agreement. Many artificial agents (AA) are 
not moral agents, of course. But some are or rather could be, if built and allowed to develop. 
This is not sci-fi and that is why we need to be very careful. I am not sure that if one could 
identify a Level of Abstraction (LoA) at which the behaviour of an agent could be ascribed 
explicitly to its designer then one should conclude that that agent would not be a moral agent. 
For, if this were the case, one day neuroscience may force us to conclude that there are no 
moral agents at all, not even human, but only agents whose actions are morally loaded. Any 
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sort of Turing test is based on the assumption of a particular phenomenon as given (e.g. 
human intelligence, moral agency, or creativity) and then a comparison with another, 
possibly indistinguishable, unknown phenomenon (e.g. artificial intelligence, moral agency 
or creativity). It is not based on an attempt to define what something is in itself (e.g. 
intelligence, moral agency, creativity). But let us not be distracted by these nuances 
concerning the debate about determinism. Grodzinsky, Miller, Wolf and I all agree that there 
are clear and uncontroversial cases in which an AA may qualify as a moral agent (in the 
article, this is the one with modifiable T that exhibits learning* and intentionality*). They 
also argue that this “does not [emphasis in the original] relieve the designer of responsibility” 
and seem to believe that I would disagree. Not at all. Not only do I share the same view, but, 
as a matter of record, I have never attributed moral responsibility to AAs, having always been 
very careful to specify that, when moral AAs are in question, what counts is their moral 
accountability. This is not philosophical hair-splitting. Parents, for example, may still be 
responsible for the way in which their adult children behave, but they are certainly not 
accountable. They might be bitterly blamed, but they will not go to prison if their son, now in 
his thirties, turns out to be a serial killer. So I agree with the conclusions reached in the paper. 
As I have been arguing for some time, engineers will be responsible for what and how they 
design AA, even if they may not be accountable. The sooner we take this on board the better. 
 The paper provides a valuable exploration of some essential questions and more 
complex scenarios that arise when discussing artificial agents at a variety of LoAs. This is 
very welcome. Equally welcome, and indeed refreshing, is the firm grasp and fruitful use of 
the method of LoAs carefully exhibited throughout the article. Two aspects that perhaps 
could have received more attention, however, concern non-software based AAs, like 
companies, or hybrid agents, to which I have often tried to call attention in my writings; and 
the way in which our reflection on agency is being improved and expanded thanks to the 
presence of non-fictional artificial agents. Ethics is obsessed with religious beliefs, 
psychologistic introspection and a reliance on often ungrounded, idiosyncratic intuitions or 
very foggy ideas (intentionality being one of them).  It is still largely centred on a stand-
alone, Cartesian-like, ratiocinating, human individual, when the world has in fact moved 
towards hybrid (think of a driver + car + GPS), distributed, and multiagent systems (there is 
probably more “moral agency” occurring at the level of governments, NGOs, parties, groups, 
companies and so forth than in any individual life). A pinch of serious computer science and 
rigorous philosophy can provide a great counterbalance. After all, artificial agents tell us as 
much about ourselves as about our artefacts. 
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Reply to Johnson and Miller 
 
It is never easy to comment on one’s own caricature. One may recognise some loosely 
familiar traits and wish to be a sport, but the distortions are so many and coarse that the 
temptation to dismiss the sketch as merely amusing is great. So let me hasten to say that, in 
the case of Johnson and Miller’s article, such temptation should be resisted. True caricatures 
are not supposed to engage with the real features of their subject either accurately or reliably. 
They are rather expected to poke some fun at them, by exaggerating or fabricating their 
shortcomings and peculiarities. They are drawn in black and white and admit no nuances. But 
the fact remains that they can also serve a serious purpose. Like magnifying glasses, they 
may succeed in calling our attention to what might be otherwise less noticeable details. It is 
in this constructive way that I suggest one may approach the article in question. But first, a 
warning. The reader interested in understanding what I actually hold and argue about 
artificial agents (and let me repeat here: these are not just computers or software artefacts, but 
also synthetic and hybrid agents such as a multinational, a government, or a tank with its 
crew and weapons) and their possible moral roles, as well as the true nature of the 
philosophical debate at stake, will do better by skipping this reply, forget about its target and 
read instead the insightful article by Alison Adam in this collection. And now, for something 
different.  
Johnson and Miller tell us a simple story. Some bad guys, the notorious band of 
computational-modelling rogues, would have us believe that artificial agents can be moral 
agents. Fortunately, the league of good guys, the computers-in-society group, comes to our 
rescue and saves the day by reconceptualising these agents for what they really are, mere 
machines under the full control of humans. Although the plot is not gripping, I quite like it. It 
is easy to follow and its happy ending is heartening. Imagine then my disappointment when I 
realised that, in one of the first episodes, I was enlisted as one of the bad guys, then soon got 
a few idiotic ideas slapped on my back, and ended up hanged for them, rather too hastily, by 
the end of the script.  
One foolish thesis I am attributed is that I, as one of “the Computational Modellers 
see computational modeling as the ultimate in the philosophical endeavour to capture 
reality”. I strongly doubt that anyone might be so silly to believe that “computational models 
represent reality [sic]”. I certainly do not. I am too much of a Kantian (Floridi [2008a] and 
Floridi [2008c] provide plenty of evidence, but see Hongladarom’s paper in this issue) to 
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consider even the possibility of “capturing reality” a serious philosophical project, let alone to 
believe that it might be pursued by the very limited means of a computational approach.  
The article continues claiming that I “seem to have confused, on the one hand, 
something being autonomous within a level of abstraction and, on the other hand, something 
being autonomous writ large”. Not at all, but I might have failed to make the point clear, or 
the authors would not be so mistaken. The method of abstraction may seem difficult to grasp, 
but its main lesson is simple enough (Floridi [2008c]). When applied to moral agents, it can 
be fruitfully used in order to understand autonomy in terms of self-regulating agency. The 
interested reader might check how, in the incriminated paper, artificial agents are shown to be 
autonomous moral agents exactly and precisely at the established (and indeed required) level 
of abstraction. The real issue is whether a better analysis, i.e. a better level of abstraction, 
may be provided. Hand-waving or feet-stomping are not an alternative, while trying to 
explain a concept (autonomous agency) by referring to more obscure concepts (freedom, 
intentionality and so forth) is simply falling into the classic fallacy of obscurum per 
obscurius.  
Further “important flaws”, which the authors fail to realise are actually in the eye of 
the beholders, relate to the basic thesis, which I am supposed to hold, that computer systems 
model human behaviour in the way scientific models model natural systems. It gets worse. 
“Their [mine included] logic assumes that because operational systems have certain 
outcomes, the behavior is equivalent to human behavior producing the same outcomes. They 
fail to see that tasks can be achieved by very different means [...]”. Honestly, not even the bad 
guys could be so obtuse. As for myself, trust me, I know that a dish-washer and I perform the 
same task and achieve the same goal through rather different means. I actually explained this 
simple distinction as textbook material in Floridi [1999], so allow me to declare myself “not 
guilty”.  
The list of accusations unravels without mercy. It includes “fail[ing] to see that 
whether or not the processes count as moral action is a matter of human convention. 
Moreover, they fail to recognize that the meanings that humans give to particular operations 
of a computer system are contingent”. This is a much more dangerous form of relativism. I do 
not believe that we can simply agree about whether any process (such as raping a child) 
counts as a moral action. Ethical discourse normally starts from the fact that it is. I like that. 
To put it shortly, the silly views I am attributed by Johnson and Miller are patently 
untenable, nobody could seriously defend them, there are no Computational Modellers 
waiting in the dark, and so the article has no trouble in refuting them. Its criticisms are 
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correct; they just fail to be relevant or interesting. Of all sins that an interpreter may commit, 
that of ignoratio elenchi (the fallacy of offering an argument that may in itself be valid, but 
that is irrelevant in that it fails to address the issue in question) is among the most 
embarrassing, for Aristotle quite rightly equated it to logical ignorance. Unfortunately, the 
article manages to commit several times. There is an Italian phrase that says that sinning is 
human, but persisting is diabolical. Let us now look at the more constructive side of the 
article. 
On 12 October 2007, during a shooting exercise at the South African Army’s Combat 
Training Centre, at Lohatlha, in the Northern Cape, a computerised Oerlikon 35mm MK5 
anti-aircraft gun went out of control and killed nine soldiers, injuring another eleven. Initially, 
the National Defence Force suspected it might have been a software glitch, but in January 
2008 the verdict was in favour of a mechanical problem combined with human negligence. I 
doubt this might be a question of “interpretive flexibility”. Johnson and Miller like to argue 
that similar issues are not a matter of truth, that there are no right answers to the question 
whether computer systems are (or ever could be considered) moral agents: “there is no truth 
to be uncovered, no test that involves identifying whether a system meets or does not meet a 
set of criteria”. This is postmodernism at its worst, a relativistic game that is fine to play in 
the ivory tower of academia, but should not be exported to real life. Because it is obviously 
untenable, it ends up fostering bad faith since we have seen that in the article, when 
convenient, references to the real and true nature of the artefacts in question (as mere 
machines) appear to play a decisive role. It is contradictory, for why worry so much about 
engineers building artificial agents that could be moral agents if it is really just a matter of 
interpretation? But ultimately, the real danger is that it seeks to block what Peirce defined as 
the road of enquiry, by means of a stumbling block of rhetoric and socio-political agendas. 
Claims such as “this group of scholars [the computers-in-society group] [...] importantly [...] 
has a stake in not [italics in the original] establishing computer systems as moral agents” not 
only are unreasonable (if artificial agents are moral agents then they are, whatever the agenda 
of a lobby of scholars might wish them to be) but also promote the sort of head-in-the-sand 
strategy (if I refuse to see it for long enough it will disappear) that has never worked in the 
past, and has always increased the amount of troubles left to resolve. Again, some bit of 
realism might help. Since August 2007, the US army has deployed to Iraq three armed robots 
known as SWORDS (Special Weapons Observation Remote reconnaissance Direct action 
system). These agents are armed with M249 machine guns. I would argue that we should 
consider very carefully whether they are or can ever become sources of actions which are 
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morally loaded (i.e. good or evil) and accountable (mind, not responsible) for foreseeable 
disasters. We should look at their design, set clear criteria that they should satisfy, investigate 
the truth about their actual specifications and safety measures and so forth, and perhaps 
conclude that they should have never been built in the first place, or deployed to that context, 
or that they ought to be dismantled as soon as possible. This and similar policies would help 
us build a better and safer environment. What I strongly doubt is that engaging in some 
“interpretive flexibility” exercise might be useful at all. Other phrases like “this group [the 
computers-in-society group] has a two-part agenda: show that technology is an important 
component of morality but also show that technology is under human control” may be good 
for military propaganda but rather hard to believe in real life. They foster a false sense of 
security, especially when you realise that, for example, US military robots ran 30,000 
missions in 2006 in Iraq and that the so called “surge” involved the deployment of 3000 new 
robots.4   
There are many important distinctions that the article fails to acknowledge or 
understand: between responsibility (human) and accountability (of whatever agent might be 
involved); between pluralism (there are many ways of analysing a phenomenon, and using 
the methodology of levels of abstraction helps to make them clear) and relativism (these ways 
are comparable and assessable as better or worse); between critical and informed discussion 
(which hopes to reach a rational consensus with the interlocutor) and agenda-driven axe-
grinding (which seeks to convince the interlocutor at all costs, irrespective of any facts and 
regulative ideal of actual truth). The list is longer, the blurring of essential, philosophical 
distinctions is unhelpful.   
The world is undergoing the fastest and most profound transformations ever 
experienced by humanity. Technology is driving them at a neck-breaking pace and it is 
constantly outpacing our reflection and deliberation. This is not a matter of techno-
determinism – a mythical bête noire long exorcised and dead. It is a far more interesting and 
subtle issue. As Shakespeare wonderfully puts it in Macbeth, we must do our best to 
understand “which seeds will grow and which will not”. It is important that collaborative 
work of the kind shown by this special issue may foster a dialogue among all stakeholders 
because we will reap what we sow, agents included. 
 
                                                 
4 Source: Wired, http://blog.wired.com/defense/2007/08/3000-more-bomb-.html 
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Reply to Adam 
 
If I were to synthesise my reply to Adam’s paper in only one sentence, I would simply 
subscribe to the following quote: “de-centring the human may not involve over-centring non-
living things”. Once this key point is grasped, it becomes difficult to move objections against 
IE’s basic tenets. Since Adam does a very good job in showing how this is the case, I shall 
limit myself to highlighting here three of the points she makes that I find most interesting.  
 First, the article convincingly argues that IE can be seen as part of a larger, 
environmental movement, which is leading ethics and the philosophy of technology away 
from entrenched anthropocentric dogmas and towards ontocentric, patient-oriented 
approaches.  The latter offer the advantage of being able to include, in their ethical 
discourses, synthetic environments, distributed and multi-agent systems as well as hybrid 
agents in which the human component is only part of the overall system. As an ethics of 
things, understood as either patients or agents, IE can thus be placed in a larger scenario of 
converging views, which include Actor-Network Theory. I must confess that I had not 
thought about it, but that I am delighted to be in such a good company. 
 A second, interesting point, raised by Adam, is that IE might be in for some heated 
debates that, she suspects, will resemble the philosophical controversies over Artificial 
Intelligence and its feasibility, which were suffered during the second half of last century. In 
this case too, I am afraid she might be right. This would be unfortunate though. For we have 
learnt little from decades of subtle arguments on the Chinese Room, for example, and the 
fruitlessness of such arm-chair speculations should have taught us a robust lesson. We shall 
see, but I am not optimistic. 
Finally, but equally importantly, the reader will notice that in Adam’s article the 
emphasis is on artificial agents broadly conceived. This is a crucial point, but it often escapes 
some of the interpreters. An artificial agent need not be a piece of software or something 
resembling a robot. True, nowadays we are witnessing an explosion of interest in webbots 
and so called artificial companions. The interactive doll Primo Puel, produced by Bandai 
(interestingly the same producer of the Tamagotchi) has sold more than one million copies 
since 2000. But, I would insist, with Adam, that the real challenge comes from the symbiotic 
mixture of biological and artificial, natural and engineered features to be found in complex 
agents. It might be the simple case of a driver, her car and her GPS on a motorway, or the 
more complex case of an M1 Abrams tank with its mechanical, electronic, computational and 
weaponry devices and a crew of 4 people, or indeed a government, an international bank or 
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any of the Fortune 500 American global corporations. More and more commonly, moral 
actions are the result of complex interactions among distributed systems integrated on a scale 
vastly larger than the single human being. Globalization is also a measure of the size of the 
agents involved in moral decisions that crucially affect the life and future of millions of 
individuals and their environments. What we are discovering is that we need an augmented 
ethics for a theory of augmented moral agency. This is where some of the challenging 
problems are arising, in terms of distributed morality. It is to be hoped that IE will be able to 
contribute to tackle them. 
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Reply to Tavani 
 
Tavani’s analysis of the ontological theory of informational privacy is outstanding. The level 
of scholarship, clarity, acumen and understanding of even the most subtle implications of the 
theory is impressive. This does not mean that Tavani agrees on everything I say. On the 
contrary, in his article he raises two specific challenges. It will be worth addressing both in 
detail and at some length. Here, I can only try to sketch the sort of approach that seems to be 
most promising. 
According to Tavani “Floridi’s theory also needs to respond to two additional 
challenges before it can be viewed as an adequate privacy theory. For one thing, it must be 
able to differentiate informational privacy from mental (or psychological) privacy, which 
Floridi (1999) recognizes as a distinct type of privacy. Additionally, his theory must be able 
to distinguish between descriptive and normative aspects of informational privacy.” Tavani is 
correct in demanding an explanation, so let me address each challenge separately. 
 Regarding the distinction between informational privacy and mental/psychological 
privacy, I agree that there is a sense in which it would be counterintuitive (if not plainly 
wrong) to collapse one onto the other. As Tavani correctly puts it, even if “I am my 
information, it should still be possible for me to distinguish between privacy invasions that 
violate me because of an (unjustified) loss of personal information and those that violate me 
because of the ‘mental harm’ that they can cause (irrespective of the kind of information 
about me that may or may not be gained by others).”  Admittedly, in the writings referred to 
by Tavani I was not interested in discussing this critical distinction.  So let me make amends.  
What Tavani sees as a risk of collapse is real, but I would urge that it can be avoided in the 
following way. On the one hand, mental/psychological privacy and informational privacy in 
the ordinary sense of the word are simply two distinct and separate phenomena. For example, 
a laptop belonging to the British Ministry of Defence was recently stolen, causing the loss of 
the personal details of 600,000 people (including passport, National Insurance numbers and 
bank details).5 Here, we are talking about a colossal breach in informational privacy, which 
does not have an obvious counterpart in mental/psychological privacy. On the other hand, in 
the ontological sense of informational privacy that I have also defended (in the sense that “to 
be is to be an informational entity”), there is a continuum between the informational nature of 
an individual and his or her mental/psychological privacy, insofar as the personal identity of 
                                                 
5 Source: BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7197628.stm 
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an individual is also constituted by her mental life. Where one decides to draw a threshold, or 
which conceptual vocabulary might be more apt to capture the relevant nuances, is probably a 
matter of circumstantial agreement. In February 2008, for example, counter-terrorism officers 
in Britain secretly and illegally recorded conversations between a politician, Tooting MP 
Sadiq Khan, and a constituent he was visiting in jail. In this case, the breach of privacy may 
be qualified as informational, but also mental/psychological, depending on which aspect one 
sees as more relevant. The fact that an informational ontology may help us to understand an 
individual as constituted by her information is meant to contribute and be complementary to 
other approaches to e.g. physical or mental/psychological privacy. In this case too, I see IE 
not as providing the only right theory, but a minimalist, common framework that can support 
dialogue.   
 Regarding the second challenge, I agree that the distinction between a naturally 
private situation and a normatively private situation is not only sound but important to 
maintain in order to be able to distinguish between loss and violation. And I also agree that 
we could preserve it by following Tavani’s suggestion of “[...] ‘contextualizing the 
infosphere’ in ways that would differentiate segments of it into contexts or ‘situations’ in 
which a certain kind of information entity (e.g., a ‘social agent’) may or may not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. In this scheme, some ‘disruptions in the infosphere’ that 
would qualify as a loss of privacy for one or more agents, might not also count as violations 
of privacy for those agents.” The work that remains to be done, as in the case of Tavani’s 
RALC framework, is to develop this approach into a full theory. It may not be easy, but it 
looks perfectly doable. 
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Reply to Capurro 
 
I admit that Capurro’s article leaves me more puzzled than enlightened. I suspect that there 
might be something to be learnt in his “continental” approach, and that his contribution to IE, 
in terms of a Heideggerian perspective, might be somehow enriching. But the distance 
between our conceptual vocabularies, philosophical methods and frames of reference has so 
far slowed me down. The following examples may clarify my difficulty to the reader. 
Capurro believes that “Value is not a property of things, […] humans are per se 
invaluable”. Now, as every schoolboy knows, if humans are things, and things have no value, 
then humans have no value. Is this what Capurro means when he calls humans invaluable? I 
doubt it, but then, either Capurro is just committing a plain logical fallacy, which seems 
unlikely, or he must mean something different from what we normally mean by “value”, 
“property”, “things”, “humans” and “invaluable”. For example, at some points, he clearly has 
in mind “economic value”, but at some other points he silently shifts to “moral value”. These 
are very different things indeed, and the ambiguity is confusing. A bit later, Capurro 
continues by claiming that “We humans, qua human, are evaluating beings (ens aestimans). 
We estimate the price of things no less than we esteem each other, learning thus to esteem 
ourselves.” This is fairly intelligible and quite uncontroversial, even if running together 
economic-price-giving activities and self- or mutual esteem processes is bewildering (this is a 
bit like someone trying to find a connection between “banks” as institutions and “banks” as 
shelving elevations in the bed of a river: I am sure some metaphorical sense can be made of 
it, but I wonder whether it might not be better to rely on some Cartesian “clear and distinct” 
ideas). However, depending on how accurate and lucid one may wish to be (and you may 
expect a philosopher to wish to be reasonably demanding here) then, in terms of evaluating, 
animals too evaluate best strategies, peers, social interactions and group hierarchies, richer 
sources of food, higher rewards, better partners, weaker foes and so forth. In a way, all 
animal life is about evaluating and being naturally selected to evaluate well. So, in the 
intelligible and uncontroversial sense of Capurro’s statement, there is nothing especially 
human about “evaluation”, unless here too Capurro means something else; but it is this “else” 
that escapes me. 
Things hardly improve in the course of the article. Suppose we managed to follow 
Capurro until now. I would expect anyone to agree that the fact that something is given an 
evaluation does not mean that it is given the right evaluation (or life would be much easier), 
that it should get an evaluation at all (Socrates docet: we often value what is worthless), or 
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that it would have no value without the evaluation, for the evaluation might be just a matter 
of value-recognition and not value-creation (imagine nobody valuing you, would you have no 
value?). Yet, Capurro ignores all these distinctions and loses me once again. Speaking of 
“mirroring the world as the common invaluable horizon that allows us to evaluate things” 
blatantly fail to help. It makes humans and the horizon equally “invaluable”, together with 
some “invaluable source we bring into the play that is also the source for the determinate 
value we ascribe to the productive action we call labour”, then “our own invaluable 
evaluating presence” and finally “human beings who function as invaluable mirrors”. The 
trouble is that, among all these invaluable items, I truly have no idea of what an “invaluable 
horizon” might be, let alone an activity such as “mirroring the world”.  In the end, we are led 
to conclude that humans are invaluable mirrors of an invaluable horizon. But what does this 
mean? “The mutual interplay of the human interplay with the common world as an invaluable 
horizon” fails to enlighten the logically-minded reader, who will be baffled by the double 
interplay with an invaluable horizon. As anticipated, I am happy to admit my limitations. 
Perhaps the conversation could be improved by a few, simple clarifications. I 
apologise to the reader, who has been following this issue of Ethics and Information 
Technology up here, for the inevitable repetitions. To bore you least, I shall be brief and 
schematic. 
First, I do not hold a digital ontology or metaphysics.6 The informational ontology I 
defend is an ontology of structures, structures are relations and relations are not the sort of 
things that can be meaningfully qualified as either analogue or digital (“being taller than”, for 
example, is not analogue/continuous or digital/discrete, the distinction simply fails to apply). 
So, the following statement “Floridi develops a metaphysical foundation of information 
ethics [...] instead of considering the digital interpretation of beings (i.e., as metaphysically 
more primary), it aims at fixing the meaning of Being within the digital perspective as today’s 
prevailing interpretation of Being” is not only completely off target but also widely so. 
Second, the infosphere is Being considered informationally, as simple as that. “Esse 
est information”, where here information is not a semantic but an ontological concept 
(imagine a structural pattern). The scientifically-minded reader may think of this ontology in 
terms of energy, matter and informational structures as being all interdefinable. So the 
citation below is badly mistaken and makes what follows it a wild goose chase: “It becomes 
clear from his argumentation that the ‘infosphere’ is conceived as ontologically different 
                                                 
6 See Floridi [2004a], Floridi [2008a] and Floridi [forthcoming]. 
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from the physical world. If this is the case, he is not arguing within the background of what I 
call digital metaphysics, i.e., the interpretation of all beings from a digital perspective. But is 
in another sense still metaphysics, as it clearly distinguishes between a physical or material 
and an immaterial world without making explicit the question of Being itself.” Honestly, I 
most definitely do not conceive of “the ‘infosphere’ as a ‘hyperreality’ separated from, as 
phenomenologists say, the ‘life world’”. Note that I might still be deluded about something 
else, yet that specific delusion is not mine.  
Third, it is disappointing to see Capurro, who is a fine scholar, failing to get a 
message I have been broadcasting widely and loudly since 1999 (see, for example, 
Hongladarom’s article in this collection, which captures it very well): entropy in IE is not 
meant to refer to the thermodynamic concept nor to Shannon¹s equivalent measure at all. It is 
a metaphysical term and means Non-Being, or Nothingness (the concepts are related, of 
course, but also have their distinct meaning and should not be confused). Metaphysical 
entropy is increased when Being, interpreted informationally, is annihilated or degraded. So, 
the four basic norms of IE discuss entropy understood as the destruction, impoverishment or 
vandalizing of Being. They do not “contradict not only the unavoidable phenomenon of, say 
ICT-generated waste and energy consumption, but also, for instance, deleting viruses, SPAM 
and all kind of ‘non useful’ information” because they are not about Shannon’s entropy, 
despite Capurro’s stubborn insistence. Frankly, who could be such a fool as to hold the views 
that Capurro rather uncharitably attributes me? I plead guilty to the use of terms, such as 
“entropy” and “information”, which have many meanings. But, in my defence, I must say that 
I have clarified what I mean by them on many occasions. 
To conclude, I entirely agree with what Capurro writes at the beginning of his article: 
“shifting from computer ethics to information ethics addresses not just the question of how 
far computers challenge the morality of our actions, but also the question of how far we – and 
I think Floridi interprets this ‘we’ as addressing not primarily computer professionals but all 
stakeholders – are challenged by what he calls the ‘infosphere’”. This is a good starting point, 
on which one can build further understanding. Towards the end of the article, Capurro quotes 
me again as saying that we need “an open and rational process of discussion about what 
needs to be done first” in our world. Since he agrees, we also share a common goal. All that 
remains to be stressed is that “rational” is not an optional qualification but plays a crucial role 
in how we may bridge the starting point with the goal. 
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Reply to Hongladarom 
 
Hongladarom has succeeded in clarifying several aspects of IE, which I have only managed 
to outline in my writings. I could start with his insightful and correct intuition that 
“Nonetheless, in agreeing with Kant that moral worth is an intrinsic property of some thing 
(humans included), Floridi’s position is much closer to that of Kant than he perhaps admits.” 
Touché. But even more importantly, Hongladarom has captured the essence of IE, namely its 
informational ontocentrism, impeccably. For the ethical ontocentrism I have been defending 
is indeed a naturalistic philosophy, in line with some of the best expressions of Western and 
Eastern thought: “If we look closely at the ancient conceptions of ethics, such as Aristotle’s 
and much of the ethical theories of the East (such as the Confucianist and the Buddhist), we 
find that these conceptions are more or less naturalist[ic]”. Plato, of course, is another great 
defender of the intrinsic “Goodness of Being”, and in Genesis we are told that the Biblical 
God not only creates the universe but also rejoices again and again at the sight of its intrinsic 
goodness. 
As Hongladarom remarks, an ontocentric approach is often threatened with the 
naturalistic fallacy. This presupposes a value-empty or value-neutral reality, from which then 
not a single drop of morality could be squeezed, on pain of contradiction. The “no ought from 
is” principle, with its Humean roots, is perfectly fine. If Being (or reality or nature or indeed 
the infosphere) is interpreted as being entirely and absolutely devoid of any moral value – if it 
is simply meaningless to say that “to be is to be good” – then any moral value, any goodness, 
and the corresponding ethical orientations that we long for, must come from elsewhere. A 
drained and dry container cannot fill itself. But if the ontic source, from which we seek to 
draw some moral guidance, is not empty, if, following Plato and Spinoza for example, we 
acknowledge that Being and Goodness are intrinsically intertwined well before any 
metaphysical or ethical discourse attempts to rescind them, then trying to extract values and 
the corresponding moral lessons from Being becomes a very natural process. One may try to 
find guidance and inspiration in the life of the universe without committing any logical 
fallacy. 
Now, it seems to me that IE has had the merit to revive if not establish this ontocentric 
perspective. I am happy to concede that perhaps it takes a spiritualistic form of naturalism to 
find the approach attractive. Any materialistic view of the world, like Hume’s, will struggle 
with the possibility that Being might be morally pregnant and overflowing with Goodness. 
And any metaphysics à la Heidegger will be too anthropocentric, self-referential, nihilistic 
 27
and reluctant to de-centralise the human condition to be truly enlightening (to see this, the 
reader is invited to read Capurro’s article in this collection, along with my response).  This is 
why it is very fruitful to read Spinoza as Hongladarom does, in terms of a naturalistic 
philosopher closer to the Greeks. 
I have learnt much from Hongladarom’s interpretation of Spinoza as a precursor of 
IE. It seems to me that, although I had some intuitions about the convergence between 
Spinoza’s and my views on the possibility of grounding the ethical discourse on an 
ontocentric and patient-oriented perspective, his article does a much better, more 
comprehensive and far more instructive job than any of my writings. I remain indebted. So let 
me conclude by endorsing Hongladarom’s perfect choice of a wonderful quote from Spinoza: 
“Only insofar as men live according to the guidance of reason, must they always agree in 
nature” (Proposition 34, 35, Part IV). This is philosophy at its best. 
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Reply to Burk 
 
Burk’s discussion of the potential application of IE to information law is fascinating. It is also 
quite inspiring. For it shows how far we have progressed since the nineties, when IE begun to 
argue for a new, informational approach to agents, their actions and environment. Overall, I 
have learnt much from Burk’s analysis and I agree with his fundamental invitation: more 
work needs to be done in IE. Although the direction is right, and the path travelled 
heartening, there is still quite a bit of road ahead. To paraphrase him, it is important that we 
look at some instances of data as representing exactly the sort of personal data that constitute 
an informational entity. “Legal doctrine in some instances proves sympathetic to such an 
assertion, but remains largely inchoate as to which data might constitute a given information 
entity in a given instance. Neither is information ethics, in its current state of development, 
entirely helpful in answering this critical question.  While information ethics holds some 
promise to bring coherence to this area of the law, further work articulating a richer theory of 
information ethics will be necessary before it can do so [italics added].” The problem, in his 
view, is that “[...] information ethics leaves open this central and exceptionally difficult 
question as to what data is or ought to be considered the individual’s data”.  Burk is right, but 
the trouble is that the question might have to be left at least partly open (and hence up to the 
court or judge to decide, case by case) for a good reason.  
What Burk is demanding is a full ontology that will tell us, with certainty and 
precision, in a variety of disparate and possibly complex cases, when some specific data are 
(or fail to be) part of what constitute an individual (and mind that the individual in question 
need not be a single individual, it could easily be a married couple, a company, a team, a 
social group and so forth). Now, in formal or engineered cases (e.g. in set theory or in the car 
industry), this is achievable, as one can be fairly sure about what does and what does not 
constitute the class of rational numbers, or the specific Jaguar parked in the garage, for 
example. But even in everyday life, when we think we should know better because we are 
dealing with concrete and very well-known entities, the fuzziness and slippery nature of the 
boundary between what counts in or out bubbles up everywhere, and it reminds us of our 
epistemic limits, if not of the ontic vagueness of reality. On 6 September 2001, for example, 
the European Parliament adopted an initiative called “25 years’ application of Community 
legislation for hill and mountain farming” in which it urged “the Commission to lay down an 
exact definition [of hill and mountain farming] based on the criteria of height (in metres), 
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slope, shortened growing seasons, and appropriate combinations of those criteria [...]”.7 That 
definition is still to be found. But then, if it is so hard to agree on an exact and 
uncontroversial understanding of what counts, for legislative and economic purposes, as hill 
and mountain farming, how much harder can it be to define all and only those data that 
constitute a person? The request for necessary and sufficient conditions is often natural but, 
equally often, needs to be resisted, if one wishes to be reasonable and accurate rather than 
precise and inflexible. Wiener famously described human beings as “patterns that perpetuate 
themselves”.8 I have argued for a very similar view in IE: we are homeostatic information 
patterns (“persistent information patterns” in the phrase that Burk attributes to Wiener). Yet, 
patterns tend to lack sharp or clear-cut edges and, being in constant dynamic evolution, they 
can easily be polymorphic. The waves on the beach are quite clearly individual waves, but 
any attempt to fix the precise drops of water that constitute each wave would be a pointless 
exercise. So, does all this mean that, although Burk is right, his demand is bound to remain 
unsatisfied? This would be overly pessimistic, for two reasons.  
On the one hand, we might not have a definition, but we can rely on our intelligent 
understanding, as in the case of the waves. Certainly, borderline, complex or extreme cases, 
such as C.B.C. Distribution and Marketing, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Mass Media, may 
test our capacity of discernment, but then, IE should be praised for opening our eyes to these 
new perspectives and for providing the right approach to tackle them (essentially: humans 
are, or at least might also be considered and treated as, informational objects), rather than 
blamed for failing to deliver a secure route to a final verdict, a request which to some may 
appear supererogatory. Thus, an influential verdict by Germany’s highest court in February 
2008 on whether the government might have the right to check remotely a citizen's computer 
has, according to many commentators, established a new “fundamental right” for the 21st 
century, according to which a person’s “private sphere” includes her computer, even when 
that person is online.9 This is going in the direction pointed by IE. 
On the other hand, and this is the alternative that Burk seems to favour and that I find 
equally appealing, it might be possible to enrich IE with some guidelines, which could bring 
some coherence to the law relevant to data representations. This is not the place to provide 
                                                 
7http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pv2/pv2?PRG=CALDOC&FILE=010906&LANGUE=EN&TPV=PROV&LAS
TCHAP=9&SDOCTA=22&TXTLST=1&Type_Doc=FIRST&POS=1 
8 This is the precise quotation from Wiener’s The Human Use of Human Beings, which can be found on p. 96. 
The phrase that Burk attributes to Wiener is not to be found in the text and is best used to describe the ontology 
that I have bene advocating. 
9 See for example the report and comments on the Spiegel International Online website, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,538378,00.html  Ralf Bendrath’ blog entry is enlightening: 
http://bendrath.blogspot.com/2008/02/germany-new-basic-right-to-privacy-of.html  
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them, but I suppose an example might be useful to illustrate the sort of research that one may 
wish to see developed in the close future. In brief, the task is to identify some criteria (recall 
the example of the definition of hill and mountain farming based on height, slope, and 
shortened growing seasons) that could help us in determining when some data are (or fail to 
be) personal data. Here is an initial proposal.  
 Let me first remind the reader about the concept of inverse function. To do so, a 
simple example will suffice. If the function is f (x) = x2, and x ranges over the domain of 
positive natural numbers (that is, x ≥ 0), then the inverse function is f –1(y) = √y, so that, if we 
have f (3) = 32 = 9, then the inverse function is √9 = 3. More precisely, if ƒ is a function 
whose domain is the set X and whose range is the set Y, then the inverse of ƒ is the function 
ƒ–1 with domain Y and range X, defined by the following rule: if f (x) = y then f –1(y) = x. The 
obvious but powerful property that an inverse function enjoys is that of uniquely identifying 
the input x of another function based only on its output y, for all y ∈ Y. In plain English, a 
function leads you from x to y and an inverse function leads you back, from y to x. Not all 
functions have an inverse function. As we all know, things in life may or may not be 
reversible: you cannot un-break the eggs you mistakenly broke (no reverse function available 
here), but you can empty the bottle you mistakenly filled. The precise concept of 
reversibility, as a reverse relation that leads us back to where we were, is what we need. If 
some data are personal data, they are linked to the person to which they belong in a way 
similar to that in which y is related to x through a function f. But then, at least in theory, one 
might be able to move not only from the person’s properties (say, Peter’s) to the data (say, 
some credit card information), but also back, and uniquely identify the properties from the 
data. This backward route is often blocked on purpose. Peter might be a conservative who 
voted for a particular presidential candidate, but the electoral system makes sure it should not 
be possible to guess who the person behind that conservative vote is. Abstract or obliterate 
sufficient details (some data), and the output becomes irreversible. This is privacy through 
irreversibility. It follows that a possible way of answering Burk’s request might be to develop 
criteria of personal data identification on the basis of their reversibility. Finger prints 
certainly seem to qualify rather well, so does DNA. What about the statistical data mentioned 
by Burk in his article? They might as well, it all depends on whether they can be reverse-
engineered, as output, in order to obtain at least some information about the original input. 
Suppose they could. Then the verdict might have to be revised, with a twist though, as I shall 
explain in the conclusion of this reply. 
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 There are slightly different versions of the following story, which seems to circulate 
among different cultures, but the reader will certainly capture its essence. A poor man has 
only a piece of bread, so he goes to a nearby rich house and holds it over the steaming pot, 
hoping to capture a bit of the flavour from the good-smelling vapour. Unfortunately, the rich 
owner of the house sees him, drags him in front of the judge, and asks him to pay for the 
smell. The judge hears the complaint. After a moment of reflection, he gives to the poor man 
a coin and asks him to throw it on the marble table as noisily as possible. The poor man 
obliges him, the judge regains his coin and dismisses the two men. When the rich man 
complains, the judge explains to him that the poor man has paid for the smell of the soup with 
the sound of the coin. Let us consider the problem analytically. The smell of the soup may or 
may not be constitutive of the soup itself. If it is not, then we have the same result reached in 
C.B.C. Distribution and Marketing, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Mass Media: smells are as 
public as players’ statistics and anyone can take advantage of them. If it is, then “taking” it 
may be worth a reimbursement, even if that smell is “public”. But then, the sound that a coin 
makes when hitting a table should be treated in the same way: it is equally public and may 
belong to the coin in a way comparable to the way in which the smell is related to the soup. 
The lesson is simple. Perhaps the U.S. Court might have hold that C.B.C. Distribution and 
Marketing, Inc. did violate the publicity rights of the players but then decided that the best 
way to settle the challenge was to allow the players, whose statistics are used, free access to 
any of the fantasy sports games offered by the company, where they could enjoy their virtual 
use (http://www.cdmsports.com/games.php). 
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